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This paper is an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) and service
initiatives to ensure joint interoperability of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. Using a consolidated initiative matrix,
visions and actions are reviewed to identify intent, and existing documents used by C4I
system planners, designers, and developers are assessed against essential system
development criteria, required baseline actions, to achieve interoperability. Findings
reveal that interoperability development guidance and tools do not address mission-
specific parameters of C4I systems. Not all C4I systems are the same. Mission-specific
requirements dictate whether a system is interoperable or not. The current
interoperability definition is quite vague for mission-specific systems, and existing DoD
and service initiatives only address general guidance to focus system development.
Common mission-specific cases are provided and demonstrate that achieving
interoperability is more than general guidance and more than the ability to pass data or
information through seamless interfaces to ensure that systems are functional.
Interoperability must be further defined by analyzing a C4I system's unique mission.
Finally, to guide C4I system design, a framework to establish quantifiable thresholds is
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This paper is an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) and service
initiatives to ensure joint interoperability of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. Chapter I provides a starting point for
readers to understand DoD and service initiatives. This chapter consists of the following
sections: purpose of thesis, methodology, scope of thesis, definitions, background, and
outline of chapters. This purpose of thesis section introduces and describes this paper's
topic and structure for the reader, and the research methodology section gives the reader a
reference perspective for the research and analysis conducted. The scope of thesis section
develops the boundaries for the thesis and research. The definitions and background
sections list Joint Publication 1-02 definitions that directly apply and establish a broad
base for the reader to understand both DoD and service initiatives. Within the
background section, overviews of the C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW) concept, DoD
Technical Architecture for Information Management (TAFIM), DoD interrelated
architectures, Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), and levels of information system (IS)
interoperability are provided.
Chapter II addresses the US Air Force perspective. This chapter contains the
following sections: vision, architectures, capabilities planning and architecture
management, and conclusion. The vision section introduces the Air Force's HORIZON
concept. The architectures section is subdivided into operational, technical, and systems
sections to identify service applications. The capabilities planning and architecture
management section describes processes established to support the development of
interoperable systems; lastly, the conclusion section recognizes that Air Force initiatives
are evolving.
Chapter III reviews Army initiatives and is divided into the following sections:
vision, architectures, and conclusion. The vision section summarizes the Army's
Enterprise Strategy, both vision and implementation plan. The architectures section
presents the Army's view of interrelated architectures to support the development of
xix
interoperable systems, and the conclusion section acknowledges that Army initiatives
have a well-established starting base and are continually evolving.
Chapter IV presents the US Navy, to include the US Marine Corps. This chapter
contains vision, architecture, and conclusion sections. The vision section outlines the
Navy and Marine Corps' Copernicus strategy, and the architecture section presents the
application of recognized DoD architectures used to achieve joint C4I interoperability.
Finally, the conclusion section identifies that Navy and Marine Corps interoperability
initiatives are progressing.
Chapters I - IV provide a broad knowledge base of both DoD and service actions
to achieve joint C4I system interoperability. Chapter V builds on this to conduct a
consolidated analysis of the entire action spectrum. Five examples are presented to
illustrate that all C4I systems are not the same—each system has its own unique functional
characteristics. This chapter contains the following sections: consolidated initiative
summary, similarities and differences, positive actions, further definitions, mission-
specific examples, and summary. The consolidated initiative summary section presents a
vision, action, and baseline action matrix to analyze DoD and service initiatives. The
similarities and differences and positive actions sections provide comments based on the
consolidated analysis, while the further definition section identifies areas requiring
additional development. Within the mission-specific examples section, five C4I systems
that require very different functional parameters to support mission objectives are
presented. Each example system subsection is divided into scenario, objective, mission
analysis, and conclusions, and examples are further compared using a mission-specific
area matrix. The summary section highlights the analysis observations.
Finally, Chapter VI contains conclusions, recommendations, and further areas of
research. Building on the previous five chapters, this chapter identifies critical issues,
provides direction, and recommends research areas requiring analysis. The conclusions
section formalizes identified analysis and observations, and the recommendations section
xx
presents three initiatives to enhance the development of joint C4I systems. Lastly, the




The time is ripe to set a course to resolve our C4I interoperability
issues. [Ref. 1]
Colin L. Powell
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
12 June 1992
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS
To paraphrase General Colin L. Powell (Retired), the time is ripe to quantitatively
define interoperability. Not all Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and
Intelligence (C4I) systems are the same. Mission-specific requirements dictate whether a
system is interoperable or not. The current interoperability definition is quite vague for
mission-specific C4I systems, and existing Department of Defense (DoD) and service
initiatives only address general guidance to focus system development. Quantifiable
parameters must be articulated for all systems to ensure interoperability. This paper
reviews current initiatives, provides an assessment of these initiatives, presents five
common examples of mission-specific requirements, and outlines a framework to better
quantify system parameters for planners, designers, and developers.
Chapter I provides a starting point for readers to understand DoD and service
initiatives. This chapter consists of the following sections: purpose of thesis,
methodology, scope of thesis, definitions, background, and outline of chapters. This
section, purpose of thesis, introduces and describes this paper's topic and structure for the
reader. The research methodology section gives the reader a reference perspective for the
research and analysis conducted. The scope of thesis section develops the boundaries for
the thesis and research. The definitions section lists Joint Publication 1-02 definitions that
directly apply, and the background section establishes a broad base for the reader to
understand both DoD and service initiatives. Within the background section, overviews
of the C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW) concept, DoD Technical Architecture for
Information Management (TAFIM), DoD interrelated architectures, Joint Technical
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Architecture (JTA), and levels of information system (IS) interoperability are provided.
The last section outlines the five chapters that follow.
Chapter II addresses the US Air Force perspective. Chapter III reviews the US
Army, and Chapter IV presents the US Navy, to include the US Marine Corps. Chapter V
is a consolidated analysis with examples that identify the need for mission-specific C4I
system profiles, and quantifiable interoperability parameters. Finally, Chapter VI contains
conclusions, recommendations, and further areas of research.
B. METHODOLOGY
Using a consolidated initiative matrix, both DoD and service visions and actions
are reviewed to identify intent. More importantly, existing documents used by C4I system
planners, designers, and developers are assessed against essential system development
criteria, and required baseline actions, to achieve interoperability. Findings reveal that
interoperability development guidance and tools do not address mission-specific
parameters of C4I systems. Common mission-specific cases are provided and
demonstrate that achieving interoperability is more than general guidance and more than
the ability to pass data or information through seamless interfaces to ensure that systems
are functional. Therefore, interoperability must be further defined by analyzing a C4I
system's unique mission. Finally, to guide C4I system design, a framework to establish
quantifiable thresholds is developed and presented using existing joint doctrine.
With the research methodology given, the following questions were proposed:
• Is the current definition of interoperability adequate to ensure the seamless
integration of C4I systems?
• What are the DoD and service initiatives to ensure C4I system
interoperability?
• Are there differences in initiatives? If so, why and how do these differences
compare?
• Are items, such as system interfaces and timing requirements, adequately
articulated through existing modeling techniques?
• Should system modeling be more than defining data elements?
• Should there be interoperability profiles based on quantifiable parameters?
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
As previously mentioned, this paper is an assessment of combined DoD and
service initiatives to ensure joint interoperability of C4I systems. Directives, guidance,
and technical architectures have been developed to conform to service initiatives in a
positive direction, but general definition is not enough. The detail of interoperability
differs for each mission-specific case. For a C4I system to be functional, certain system
parametric requirements must be met. With the vast amount of participants, standards,
and systems involved, solid general guidance enhances the development of interoperable
systems, but every system is not the same.
D. DEFINITIONS
Joint Publication 1-02 defines the following terms:
1. Architecture
A framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the elements of the
subject force, system, or activity. [Ref. 2]
2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel,
equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of
command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems.
[Ref. 2]
3. Interoperability
• The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
• The condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when
information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between
them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when
referring to specific cases. [Ref. 2]
4. Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
Systems
The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to
theater level and below commanders for planning, directing, and controlling operations of
assigned and attached forces pursuant to the mission assigned and which provide(s) for
the conveyance and/or exchange of data and information from one person or force to
another. [Ref. 2]
E. BACKGROUND
It is DoD policy to acquire quality products that satisfy the needs of the
operational user with measurable improvements to mission accomplishment. [Ref. 3] The
application of this concept is true for the entire acquisition process and is a cornerstone
for interoperability. The threat to the United States has drastically changed, and the way
the services fight has been altered to meet this challenge. No longer are there single
service operations. Today, a multi-service force meets mission objectives in several
operational environments—the battlespace. To better support and improve mission
accomplishment, the Joint Staff developed the C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW) concept.
1. C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW)
The unifying theme of the C4IFTW concept is to achieve global interoperability that will:
allow any Warrior to perform any mission at any time, and any place; be responsive, and
reliable, secure; and be affordable. [Ref. 1]
This concept addresses joint force C4I interoperability issues in a evolutionary
manner. Building upon lessons learned from previous conflicts, rapidly changing
technology, and the changing national security strategy, this concept provides a three
phase roadmap to achieve total interoperability of C4I systems. Figure 1 illustrates the
Joint Task Force (JTF) C4I objective. The phases of the roadmap are: Quick Fix Phase,
Mid-Term Phase, and Objective Phase. [Ref. 1]
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Figure 1. Joint Task Force C4I Objective [From Ref. 1]
The focus of the Quick Fix Phase was to be achieve interoperability of existing
systems. [Ref. 1] In 1993, this phase was considered a success based on the following
actions: translators and interpreters were developed along with data base interoperability,
C4I requirements and architectures were synchronized, and a solid foundation of joint
interoperability policy and doctrine was established. [Ref. 4] Items, such as DoD
Directive 4630.5, DoD Instruction 4630.8, Joint Publications 6-0 and 6-02, joint training
exercises, and the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations (JWIDs) are products of
this phase.
Within the current Mid-Term Phase, total interoperability must be achieved for
new C4I systems during development, testing, acquisition, and implementation.
Additionally, this includes establishing a joint wide area network based on digital
commonality—the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). [Ref. 4] This phase is
continually evolving with changing technology, new directives, and updated standards.
Finally, using the experience gained in the first two phases and advancing
technologies, the Objective Phase addresses optimizing C4I support for the Warrior. The
objectives are to create a multi-functional, multimedia terminal fitted to the Warrior's
manprint, a fully integrated tactical picture based on fused information from the
battlespace and an integrated global infosphere. [Ref. 4]
2. DOD Technical Architecture for Information Management (TAFIM)
The Technical Architecture for Information Management (TAFIM) is designed to
guide the development of the DoD infrastructure. It provides the services, standards,
design concepts, components, and configurations to guide the development of technical
architectures. The TAFIM promotes interoperability of information systems, but does not
address mission-specific applications/systems. Within the DoD, using the TAFIM is
mandatory. If everyone follows the DoD directive to use it, more C4I systems will
become more interoperable. The proper application of the TAFIM is expected to: [Ref. 5]
• Promote integration, interoperability, modularity, and flexibility
• Guide acquisition and reuse
• Speed the delivery of information technology with lower costs
The TAFIM Version 2.0 is divided into the following volumes: Volume 1,
Overview; Volume 2, Technical Reference Model, a conceptual model for information
system services and their interfaces; Volume 3, Architecture Concepts and Design
Guidance, concepts and guidance to support the development of technical architectures;
Volume 4, DoD Standards-Based Architecture Planning Guide, a standards-based
architecture planning methodology; Volume 5, Support Plan, describes how to use
TAFIM guidance for acquisition (Draft); Volume 6, DoD Global Security Architecture,
common DoD security requirements; Volume 7, Information Technology Standards
Guidance, DoD profile of standards; and Volume 8, DoD Human Computer Interface
(HCI) Style Guide, a common framework for HO design and implementation. [Ref. 5]
TAFIM, Version 3.0 Draft, is currently posted for review on the world wide web
(WWW).
3. DOD Interrelated Architectures
With the rapid growth of architectures in recent years, the DoD defined an
interrelated set of architectures to support the development of interoperable systems:
Operational, Technical, and Systems. The Operational Architecture describes the tasks,
operational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or support a
warfighter function. The Technical Architecture is the minimal set of rules that governs
the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the parts or elements whose purpose
is to ensure that a system satisfies a specified set of requirements. The Systems
Architecture is the descriptions, including graphics, of systems and interconnections
providing for or supporting a warfighting functions. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships
of these architectures. [Ref. 6]
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Figure 2. Relationships of Architectures [From Ref. 6]
4. Joint Technical Architecture (JTA)
On 12 March 1996, the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), Version 0.5
Preliminary Draft, was posted for evaluation on the WWW. This document was
developed by a working group using the Army's Technical Architecture (ATA) as a
starting point; the ATA will be covered in Chapter III. The JTA has three mutually
supporting objectives: [Ref. 6]
• To provide the foundation for a seamless flow of information and
interoperability among all tactical, strategic, and sustaining base systems that
produce, use, or exchange information electronically.
• To mandate standards and provide guidelines for system development and
acquisition which will significantly reduce cost, development time, and
fielding time for improved systems.
• To influence the direction of the information industry's technology
development by stating the DoD's direction and research and development
investment so that it can be more readily leveraged in systems within DoD.
Eventually, the JTA will apply to all systems that produce, use, or exchange
information electronically. This initial version is focused on C4I systems and their
interfaces with other entities, such as weapon systems, sensors, office automation
systems, etc., to support interoperability. Operational requirements developers will use
the JTA to guide the development of requirements and functional descriptions. System
developers will use the JTA to ensure that new and upgraded systems meet established
interoperability requirements, and system integrators will use this document to facilitate
the integration of both existing and new systems.
The JTA contains the following seven sections: Overview, Information
Processing Standards, Information Transfer Standards, Information Modeling and Data
Exchange Standards, Human-Computer Interfaces, Information Systems Security, and
Emerging Standards. [Ref. 6]
Section 4, Information Modeling and Data Exchange Standards, identifies the
minimum information standards applicable to information modeling and exchange of
information for all DoD programs. The Integrated Definition (IDEF) modeling methods
have been adopted by the DoD to support the identification of information and
information exchange requirements for the development of interoperable systems. Federal
X
Information Processing (FIPS) Publication 183, Integration Definition for Function
Modeling (IDEFO), is used to guide activity modeling, while FIPS Publication 184,
Definition for Information Modeling (IDEF1X), is used to govern data modeling. Using a
common language, IDEFO activity models capture an organization's processes at the
highest logical levels. Processes are further decomposed into lower logical levels to
uncover supporting processes. [Ref. 6]
The DoD created the Defense Data Dictionary System (DDDS) to provide a single
authoritative source for data standards. Managed by DISA, the DDDS, a DoD-wide
central data base, includes standard data entities and elements and access to data models.
Also, the DDDS is used to collect individual data standards and document content and
format for data elements. An objective view of how the adopted modeling methods and
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Figure 3. Objective Information Standards Technical Architecture [From Ref. 6]
5. Levels of Information System (IS) Interoperability
In 1993, DoD services and agencies realized that the existing interoperability
definition was insufficient. As a result, a simple six-level construct was developed to
describe different levels of interoperability. Figure 4 provides a description of these levels
along with enabling capabilities for each level. [Ref. 7]
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Figure 4. Levels of Interoperability (circa 1993) [From Ref. 7]
In April 1995, the Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC) expressed an interest
in pursuing the levels construct as a basis for joint systems certification, and recently, the
C4I Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration Task Force (C4ISR ITF) endorsed the
concept. The MITRE Corporation recently updated the concept to integrate the planned
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functions of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), emerging Internet services, and
six NATO interoperability levels. Currently, MITRE is coordinating with key DoD
organizations for levels refinement. [Ref. 7] Figure 5 depicts the revised levels construct.
The revised construct contains three interoperability categories: transaction,
service, and application. The transaction category addresses the ability to establish a
connection between discrete systems and conduct basic exchanges of data. The service
category addresses the interoperability effects of: distributed computing services,
community leveraging of common solutions, establishing standard system and user
interfaces, and exchanging more complex data types. Finally, the application category
addresses the establishment of the C4ISR IS objective based on C4IFTW vision. [Ref. 7]
The categories are further subdivided into levels as annotated in Figure 5.
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F. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
1. Chapter II - United States Air Force
This chapter summarizes the US Air Force's HORIZON vision and supporting
actions to achieve interoperability. The service perspective and existing tools in use are
described to outline the Air Force's perspective to develop interoperable systems.
2. Chapter III - United States Army
The US Army's Enterprise vision and implementation plan are presented along
with the established processes to achieve the development of interoperable systems.
3. Chapter IV - United States Navy and Marine Corps
The Copernicus vision and Marine Corps Technical Architecture are discussed to
outline the US Navy and Marine Corps' actions to ensure the development of
interoperable C4I systems.
4. Chapter V - Analysis
Chapter V provides a consolidated view of the DoD and service initiatives to
address interoperability of C4I systems. Documented actions are compared and
consolidated within an analytical matrix format. Mission-specific interoperability profiles
are presented to clearly identify that individual system requirements may require different
design parameters for systems to function.
5. Chapter VI - Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter contains conclusions, recommendations, and further research areas
based on the Chapter V analysis. A framework to quantify C4I system parameters is
outlined.
12
II. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
History has shown that the side that effectively analyzes, decides, and
acts the fastest will prevail in any conflict. We can and must make
optimum use of information technology to operate inside any opponent's
decision cycle. [Ref. 8]
Ronald R. Fogleman
USAF Chief of Staff
August 1995
A. INTRODUCTION
With the world changing, information is becoming a new center of gravity—
a
strategic asset, inviting attack and requiring protection. Before, warfare was only
considered in air, land, sea, and space operational environments, but the Air Force has
now recognized information as a fifth operational environment. Information dominance is
crucial to military success across the spectrum of conflict. [Ref. 8]
Chapter II contains the following sections: vision, architectures, capabilities
planning and architecture management, and conclusion. The vision section introduces the
Air Force's HORIZON concept. The architecture section is subdivided into operational,
technical, and systems sections to identify service applications. The capabilities planning
and architecture management section describes processes established to support the
development of interoperable systems; lastly, the conclusion section recognizes that Air
Force initiatives are evolving.
B. VISION
In 1993, realizing the importance of information technology, the US Air Force
developed the HORIZON concept as an extension of the Joint Staffs C4I for the Warrior
(C4IFTW) construct for joint interoperability. This concept focused on information
architectures to develop an integrated and responsive global infosphere that supports both
Global Reach and Global Power objectives. For the first time, the Air Force sought to
define a path to a service-wide architecture of C4I systems. This past year, the Air Force
13
updated their vision with C4I HORIZON '95. This document expands the previous
HORIZON vision by establishing 21 st century information infrastructure objectives and
plans for rapid integration of evolving technology within the current and future
infrastructure. C4I HORIZON '95 contains the visions for achieving information
superiority and leading the US Air Force into the information age. This updated edition
defines a planning perspective and evolutionary path for information systems and the
application of information technology across the spectrum of Air Force operations. [Ref.
8]
C. ARCHITECTURES
With the vision to seamlessly integrate information systems, the Air Force created
a framework to coordinate and integrate related major command (MAJCOM) information
architectures. As defined by the Defense Science Board, and previously mentioned in
Chapter I, background section, the Air Force adopted the three broad constructs for
information requirements and planning: operational, technical, and system architectures.
[Ref. 8]
1. Operational
The Air Force models operational architectures that represent a description of the
tasks, operational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or support a
warfighting function. [Ref. 8]
2. Technical
The Air Force is currently drafting a service technical architecture that will be released
for review on the WWW in May or June 1996. The architecture will reflect a minimal set
of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the parts or
elements of a system. [Ref. 8] Until the service technical architecture is finalized, C4I
system designers are required to use established technical reference codes (TRCs). To
assist C4 systems designers during acquisition and modification of C4I systems, the
USAF created TRCs. TRCs are a set of reference documents containing policy,
directives, transition guidance and standards that designers can easily access using
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various web browsers on the WWW. They assist planners with standardizing systems to
ensure interoperability of future developments. TRCs bring together government and
non-government standards and Air Force and DoD policies and guidance for C4I systems
and system components of both fixed and deployed systems. TRCs are based on the
TAFIM, and they articulate standards to ensure interoperability. Through the process of
combining standards and interoperability related documents, a detailed profile is created
for almost every conceivable system; therefore, solid guidance for interoperability is
provided. [Ref. 9]
There are two types of TRCs: Component and Service. Information for
Component TRCs is organized by categories of system components, and information for
Service TRCs is organized by user C4I system capability. Usually, Component TRCs are
used for smaller acquisitions and piece-part buys, while Service TRCs address larger
acquisitions and procurement of a C4I user requirement capability. [Ref. 9] Table 1
outlines the orientations of both TRC types.
Service TRCs Tend to Address: Component TRCs Tend to Address:
Larger Acquisitions Smaller Acquisitions
Entire C4I Systems Individual Components of C4I Systems
Broad-Based Ideas Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Solutions
Abstract Interoperability Guidance Interoperability Guidance For Specific Components
Concerns For System Designs Strategies For Meeting The Specifications of
System Design
Table 1. Orientation of Service and Component TRCs [From Ref. 9]
As users access TRCs for information, they start with top level requirements and
move down the tree structure depicted in Figure 6. Depending on the level of detail and
information required, users may have to reference one or more sub-levels to collect all
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Figure 6. TRC Tree Structure [After Ref. 9]
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3. Systems
The Air Force further defines their C4I systems through system architectures.
These architectures provide a description, including graphics, of the systems and
interconnections providing for or supporting a warfighter function. [Ref. 8]
D. CAPABILITIES PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURE MANAGEMENT
The C4I capabilities planning process, Figure 7, is designed to link operational
needs to architectures, and provide a top-level, enterprise-wide view, so systems
architects may design fully integrated joint C4I systems. [Ref. 8] Automated tools are
used to display, analyze, and manage key architecture elements and interconnections







Figure 7. C4I Capabilities Planning Process [From Ref. 10]
The Air Force is institutionalizing C4I Codes, Permits, and Inspections (CPI) to
ensure that C4I capabilities and architectures are used throughout the requirements,
acquisition, and testing processes. This guides system acquisition to ensure developers
follow established building codes. [Ref. 8]
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Figure 8 illustrates the HORIZON architecture management process. Within this
process, a database is used to develop service-wide architectures. Eventually, the database
will be automatically updated from MAJCOM architectural activity databases and tools.






















Figure 8. HORIZON Architecture Management Process [From Ref. 8]
CONCLUSION
The Air Force's strategy to ensure interoperability is continuously evolving. Many
actions outlined within the HORIZON vision have taken place, while others are currently
being developed and refined. To better guide Air Force personnel through C4I capability
development, paperless information sharing is established via the WWW.
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III. UNITED STATES ARMY
As we know, the challenges of joint interoperability are great. The
Enterprise Strategy is the framework by which we will meet and conquer
these challenges. It is a vision for present and future information support
for our Total Army. [Ref 1 1]
Gordon R. Sullivan




Recent history and changes in the world have altered the focus for today's armed
forces. Today's threats are less defined and pose unique challenges for warfighters to
counter. From the Army's view, countering tomorrow's threats requires "Winning the
Battlefield Information War."[Ref. 11]
Chapter III is divided into the following sections: vision, architectures, and
conclusion. The vision section summarizes the Army's Enterprise Strategy, both vision
and implementation plan. The architectures section presents the Army's view of
interrelated architectures to support the development of interoperable systems, and the
conclusion section acknowledges that Army initiatives have a well-established starting
base and are continually evolving.
B. VISION
As stated in Army Enterprise Strategy: The Vision, the purpose of the Army
Enterprise Strategy is to support US Army warfighters into the 21st century. The strategy
is designed to: unify the C4I community toward a common goal; establish a structure to
guide the system development process; develop economic, functional, and technical
guidelines and criteria to aid resource managers in making C4I system assessments; and
provide a broad systems perspective across DoD. [Ref. 11]
As previously mentioned, for the Army to counter today's threats, warfighters
must "Win the Battlefield Information War." Through the exploitation of information
19
technology, this goal is achievable. That is why the Enterprise Strategy focuses on
identifying, supplying, and implementing sophisticated information and other C4I
technologies in support of the warfighter. [Ref. 1 1 ]
The Enterprise Strategy contains both a vision and an implementation plan. The
vision introduces and explains ten principles needed to ensure the warfighter has
information superiority over any adversary. The following principles are exclusively
taken from the Enterprise vision document: [Ref. 11]
• Focus on the Warfighter - Provide the Warfighter C4I systems that meet
validated needs.
• Ensure Joint Interoperability - Provide the Warfighter C4I systems that
interoperate in Joint and Combined operations.
• Capitalize on Space-Based Assets - Provide the Warfighter assured access to
mission essential military and commercial space-based systems that support
the Force Projection Army across the entire operational continuum.
• Digitize the Battlefield - Provide the Warfighter an integrated digital
information network that supports warfighting systems and assures C2
decision-cycle superiority.
• Modernize Power Projection Platforms - Provide the Warfighter a modern
power projection platform to support peacetime operations, mobilization,
force projection, split-base operations, and redeployment.
Optimize the Information Technology Environment - Provide the Warfighter
with more efficient information support for combat and peacetime operations.
Implement Multi-Level Security - Provide the Warfighter the ability to access
and exchange information at needed levels of classification using a single C4I
system.
Acquire Integrated Systems Using Commercial Technology - Provide the
Warfighter C4I capabilities that leverage commercial technology.
Ensure Spectrum Supremacy - Provide the Warfighter electromagnetic
spectrum supremacy in order to maximize the benefits of maneuver and tempo
in conjunction with firepower.
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• Exploit Modeling and Simulation - Provide the Warfighter with cost effective
training, testing, and rapid prototyping through state-of-the-art modeling and
simulation.
As indicated by the principles, the present and future ways the Army intends to
conduct military operations is going through a dramatic change. The operational
environment is no longer a localized area or geographically contained. The intelligent
application of Information Age technology will equip warfighters with the necessary
tools to access critical information and enhance coordination for the successful execution
ofjoint or combined operations.
Based on the sound principles established within the vision, the implementation
plan provides an assessment of existing systems, an investment strategy or blueprint for
the future, and an action plan to implement the strategy. Specific tasks are identified and
responsibilities are assigned to focus a unified effort. [Ref. 1 2]
C. ARCHITECTURES
Due to the rapid growth of architectures within the C4I and information system
communities in recent years, the Army Science Board (ASB) conducted a study in the
Summer of 1994. As a result, an interrelated set of architectures was defined:
Operational, Systems, and Technical. As mentioned in Chapter I, these concepts were
adopted by the DoD as well as the Army Enterprise Strategy. [Ref. 13] Figure 9
illustrates the relationship among these architectures. This figure along with the
architecture definitions differ slightly from Figure 2, Relationships of Architectures, and
definitions presented in Chapter I; the Army Technical Architecture (ATA) was the
starting point for the JTA and has been further developed with other service documents
by a multi-service committee to support the joint community. [Ref. 6] The following
architecture definitions were exclusively taken from the ATA.
1. Operational
The Operational Architecture, often graphical, describes force elements and
information exchange requirements between these elements. [Ref. 13] The Army is
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currently developing these architectures based on the Force XXI initiative, a
reconceptualization and redesign of the force at all echelons. The application of
advanced technology on today's modern battlefield is altering these architectures.
Architecture
> Technical Architecture is the




> System Architecture is a physical
implementation of the OA, the
layout and relationship of
computers and communications
Figure 9. Different Architectures [From Ref. 13]
2. Technical
As defined in the ATA, the Technical Architecture is the minimal set of rules that
governs the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the parts or elements that
together may be used to form an information system. The ATA is recognized as a set of
"building codes" and applies to all systems that produce, use, or exchange information
electronically. Released 30 January 1996, Version 4.0 is based on the TAFIM, DoD
Directive 8320-series governing standardization, and the Army's initiatives to streamline
the acquisition process. Articulated in the ATA are three mutually supporting objectives:
[Ref. 13]
• To provide the foundation for seamless flow of information and
interoperability among all tactical, strategic, and sustaining base systems that
produce, use, or exchange information electronically.
22
• To provide guidelines and standards for system development and acquisition
that will dramatically reduce cost, development time, and fielding time for
improved systems.
• To influence the direction of the information industry's technology
development and research and development investment so that it can be more
readily leveraged in Army systems.
The ATA consists of the following six sections: Overview, Information
Processing Standards, Information Modeling and Data Exchange Standards, Human-
Computer Interfaces, and Information Security.
3. System
The Systems Architecture is the description, including graphics, of the systems
solution used to satisfy the warfighter's Operational Architecture requirement.
D. CONCLUSION
The Army Enterprise Strategy starts with sound principles to establish a tightly
focused vision for the Army C4I community. By using a process-oriented view for joint
C4I systems development, the Army will achieve intended objectives outlined within the




IV. UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
We have to be able to adapt quickly to changing technology to fight
and win wars in the Information Age. It is clear that information has
become a major factor in warfare and will grow in importance in the next
century. [Ref. 14]
Admiral J. M. Boorda, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
February 1996
A. INTRODUCTION
As the Information Age emerged, the US Navy recognized the potential of using
information as a warfighting tool. In response, the Navy developed a strategy to make
C4I systems more responsive for the warfighter. For modern warfare in the joint
battlespace, the requirement for information dominance has become essential.
Information-based warfare allows warfighters to increase the operational tempo of battle
by exploiting advanced weapons technology. [Ref. 14]
This chapter contains vision, architecture, and conclusion sections. The vision
section outlines the Navy and Marine Corps' Copernicus strategy, and the architecture
section presents the application of recognized DoD architectures used to achieve joint C4I
interoperability. Finally, the conclusion section identifies that Navy and Marine Corps
interoperability initiatives are progressing.
B. VISION
Copernicus provides a focus for the Navy and Marine Corps to make C4I systems
more responsive to the warfighter, to field C4I systems more quickly, to capitalize on the
advances of technology, and to shape doctrine with these changes. In 1992, the Navy and
Marine Corps team published "...From the Sea, " and along with Copernicus, these
documents reflect the shift from a maritime, open-ocean warfighting environment to joint
operations in the littoral. Copernicus is designed as a user-centered C4I information
management architecture; this provides a framework for capturing technological change.
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[Ref. 14] Warfighters are supported at all levels: watchstander, shore commanders,
Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC), and Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF).
Exclusively defined in Copernicus... Forward, Copernicus contains the following
five essential elements that provide architectural oversight to leverage the C4I
infrastructure effectively and enhance the C4I operational perspective. [Ref. 14]
• Seamlessly blend, through common applications in one workstation, critical
tactical, operational and administrative data to the warfighter, thus allowing
tactical objectives to drive operations.
• Assimilate required information rapidly through standardized data formats,
permitting operational commanders and users to "pull" desired information to
accomplish tasks. A two-way intelligent "push" capability supplements user-
pull when required and prevents information overload.
• Provide information using integrated data formats in a multimedia
environment where form fits function (i.e., voice, video, imagery, and tactical
data at high speeds).
• Provide a common operating environment (COE) that standardizes
workstations for the operator. Workstation and user interface standardization
permits greater operator proficiency while reducing training requirements.
• Use common building blocks for modular and standardized hardware design,
which permit upgrades and additions to the architecture in an expeditious
manner.
Copernicus, a framework of five interactive pillars, links command and control
processes at all echelons of command. The pillars include: Global Information Exchange
System (GLOBIXS), a system that supports commanders through access to a series of
wide area Defense Communications System (DCS) networks; CINC Command Complex
(CCC), a primary gateway for communications and information flow from GLOBIXS to
deployed forces via Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS); TADIXS,
tactical networks connecting to the CCCs with the Tactical Command Centers (TCCs);
TCC, a forward deployed command center, ashore or afloat, that disseminates
information to the warfighter; and Battlecube Information Exchange System (BCIXS), a
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system that supports the battlecube in which tactical forces operate. [Ref. 14] Figure 10







Figure 10. Pillars of Copernicus [From Ref. 14]
Copernicus provides four essential C4I functions: common tactical picture (CTP),
connectivity, sensor-to-shooter, and information warfare (IW). The CTP is the
information from sensors to the shooter that allows the tactical commander to understand
the battlespace, and connectivity links communications nodes to implement the sensor-to-
shooter construct. This construct focuses on the process of putting the weapon on target.
The migration of the decision-making process from upper echelons down to the tactical
commander, or shooter, provides a true sensor-to-shooter environment. As illustrated in
Figure 1 1 , the span of control compresses under the sensor-to-shooter construct. Finally,
information warfare (IW) is any action to confuse or destroy the enemy's information
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and/or information systems while leveraging and protecting friendly information and/or











Figure 11. Span of Control [From Ref. 14]
C. ARCHITECTURES
As defined by the Defense Science Board, and previously mentioned in Chapter I,
background section, the Navy adopted the three broad constructs for information
requirements and planning: operational, technical, and system architectures.
1. Operational
The Navy and Marine model operational architectures that represent a description
of the tasks, operational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or
support a warfighting function.
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2. Technical
The Navy does not have a technical architecture, but expects to fully embrace the
JTA as the draft becomes final. Currently, the TAFIM, supplemented with Naval
publications, is used to guide system development. For example, the Naval Warfare
Tactical Database (NWTDB) Standards Manual provides data element formats and inter-
system database exchange structures for system developers, database producers, and
operational users. It contains administrative information needed to integrate standards
into existing systems, data models, data sets, and data elements that support the evolving
DoD standards. [Ref. 15]
Figure 12 is the Navy's objective C4I database architecture. This shows a
common interface language or data transfer structure that is required to support common
processing in an open systems environment. The database architecture is composed of:
standardized data elements, which facilitate the exchange of data by automated systems;
normalized logical structure, which provides a standard for human and machine to relate
and exchange data; and designated sources, for the production of reference data. [Ref. 15]
In October 1995, the Marine Corps published a technical architecture that applies
to all Marine Corps programs for Command and Control (C2) systems. This document
provides a minimal set of rules for system development and is designed to ensure
interoperability among operating forces, the Marine Corps supporting establishment, and
joint C2 systems. The architecture leverages commercial technology and defines Marine
Corps specific standards where joint standards do not exist. As with all interoperability
documents, this one is continually evolving and future versions will reflect changes in
Navy and Marine Corps efforts and interoperability requirements with other DoD
agencies. [Ref. 16]
This Marine Corps Technical Architecture (MCTA) is divided into the following
sections: Overview, Information Processing Standards, Information Transfer Standards,
Information Standards, Marine-Machine Interfaces, and Minimum Desktop Computer
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Figure 12. Objective C4I Database Architecture [From Ref. 15]
3. System
The Navy and Marine Corps use systems architectures as descriptions, including




Copernicus, the Navy and Marine Corps strategy to achieve joint C4I
interoperability, is fielded and operational, but is continually evolving. Recently, key
agencies from the Navy and Marine Corps met to focus Copernicus efforts toward
improving support for the Navy and Marine team. By leveraging commercial technology
and following simple rules for C4I development, interoperability will be achieved and






The previous chapters introduced and provided a broad knowledge base of both
DoD and service actions to achieve joint C4I system interoperability. Chapter V builds on
this to conduct a consolidated analysis of the entire action spectrum. Five examples are
presented to illustrate that all C4I systems are not the same—each system has its own
unique functional characteristics, and mission-specific qualities are identified.
This chapter contains the following sections: consolidated initiative summary,
similarities and differences, positive actions, further definition, mission-specific
examples, and summary. The consolidated initiative summary section presents a vision,
action, and baseline action matrix to analyze DoD and service initiatives. The similarities
and differences and positive actions sections provide comments based on the consolidated
analysis, while the further definition section identifies areas requiring additional
development. Within the mission-specific examples section, five C4I systems that require
extremely different functional parameters to support mission objectives are presented.
Each example system subsection is divided into scenario, objective, mission analysis, and
conclusions, and examples are further compared using a mission-specific area matrix.
Finally, a summary section highlights the analysis observations.
B. CONSOLIDATED INITIATIVE SUMMARY
After reviewing the Joint Staffs C4IFTW documents, a general list of actions to
achieve interoperability was prepared to compare DoD and service initiatives to ensure
interoperability. From this, a consolidated initiative matrix, Table 2, was developed to
compare service vision and implementation documents. Table 2 is divided into three
major sections: vision, actions, and baseline actions (today). The vision identified within
the C4IFTW concept is:
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• Achieve global C4I joint interoperability,
• That will allow any Warrior to perform any mission—anytime, any place,
• That is responsive, reliable, secure, and
• That is affordable. [Ref. 1]
In Table 2, the vision section denotes the key documents that provide each
service's vision to achieve interoperability. The actions section contains explicit tasks
outlined in the C4IFTW vision that must occur to attain this goal. Most of these actions
are Mid-term Phase actions as outlined by the C4IFTW roadmap. Documents identified
are not all-inclusive, but the list provides starting points that formalize system
development to pursue interoperability. Finally, the baseline actions section contains
publications and tools that are used by C4I system planners, designers, and developers
today.
As noted from the publication dates, the efforts to reach interoperability are
continually evolving. The actual content from the publications provided may have the
same purpose, but there are different objectives to meet individual service needs and
expectations.
C. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
As identified in Table 2, there are some similarities and differences between DoD
and service actions. Even though this table provides differences from service-to-service,
readers must address the specific content of these documents to identify the actual
similarities and differences for each service.
Every service has a vision, and each vision is tailored to support individual
service needs and expectations. For example, the Army is the lead service with respect to
the definition and development of technical architectures, while the Air Force has much











































































































































































D D is 2 2 2 2 r
^i C ii ^
o
< < <
o o » a



























(5 Ci *TJ nj
W - o p




















































^J *. •-•p° oi






s oo > aQ- St
tn 3 3" B
i-j CL A AO C n
3 o a ^
(/i 5T 5a
A oq p 5' o














































































B B g B B
o o o o o
P o o o o o
*—
(A hO hO u H O HO HO a
a H Wh W H u W H to 1-3 »h CO
CO
A w t^ in 1^
o
00 w 1^ n t^ ^?^ 5
to
3
s S B B B
a o o o O
00 o o o o o0
a
W > D >° au
o
CO
>D >° > D a
o H
-3 -3 -3 t3 H -3 •-a t3 H -3 CO
o







s B S B B
o o o o a
l—^l o t-yi o o o CO





H o h H H aCO<0 > Si > ^ > ^ >^





Now that all services have a centralized focus and vision for interoperability, C4I
system development promotes seamless interfaces that support the warfighter's needs. As
the basic building blocks for automated systems, standard data elements are essential for
interoperability. Without a centralized starting point, efforts would be useless.
Additionally, through modeling and simulation (M & S) techniques, C4I system
designers and developers refine system parameters to ensure interoperability, which
clearly assist with the definition of C4I systems. Even though the Air Force does not have
a technical architecture to guide system development, they provide an exceptional on-
line, up-to-date system development information source with TRCs. The ability to access
existing standards in near real-time is invaluable to C4I system development.
E. FURTHER DEFINITION
Even with a centralized focus and vision for interoperability, there are several
areas that must be further defined to streamline the development process: the definition of
interoperability is mission-specific, existing standards (e.g., TAFIM) are too large and
lack consistency [Ref. 8], and there is no formal process to develop interoperable systems
from the DoD interrelated set of architectures. Depending on the mission purpose of a
C4I system, individual functional characteristics may differ. Systems support the
Warfighter and command and control functions, but interoperability is not always the
same. For example, systems passing imagery in near real-time are not designed to pass
information or data that is essential to counter a real-time threat, such as incoming enemy
aircraft. The detail of interoperability must be defined from a C4I system's functional
mission.
Existing development standards have grown too large for quality management.
Using a paperless information sharing environment, as employed by the Air Force with
TRCs, will make usable standards more accessible to planners, developers, and designers.
The organization and format of TRCs provides clear guidance for system development.
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Now that the DoD has defined a set of interrelated architectures, a process must be
developed to use these tools to build interoperable systems. Currently, key people,
systems engineers, etc., must continually be involved and formally track system design
considerations to maintain interoperability. Inter-connectivity is as important as intra-
connectivity for all C4I systems.
F. MISSION-SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
After recognizing that interoperability is mission-specific, identifying common
parameters with different characteristics or values becomes more apparent. The following
examples provide individual mission-specific profiles. From these examples, a mission-
specific matrix is developed to demonstrate that there are quantitative differences for each
system.
1. Joint Air Defense Mission Profile
a. Scenario
Joint air defense consists of some combination of Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine systems working together to detect, track, identify, engage, and kill hostile air
threats. ASCIET 95 (All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team) tests at
Gulfport, Mississippi, during September 1995, serve as an example of a joint air defense
mission. The purpose of the ASCIET 95 program was to examine current multi-service
combat identification (CID) procedures and capabilities on the battlefield and to identify
necessary changes to systems interoperability, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP). [Ref. 17]
Figure 13 shows a schematic view of the ASCIET 95 scenario. The joint
air defense system consisted of Navy Aegis cruisers stationed in the Gulf off of Gulfport;
Army PATRIOT batteries stationed near Gulfport; a variety of aircraft overhead
including an Air Force AWACS and RC-135, and Navy E-2s and a EP-3; and Marine
close-in air defense systems including HAWK, Low Altitude Air Defense
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(LAAD)/Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) at Camp Shelby, approximately 50 miles
north of Gulfport. [Ref. 17]
Figure 13. ASCIET95 Scenario [From Ref. 17]
During exercises, red opposition aircraft flew strike routes from Eglin
AFB over the Gulf, then into Gulfport and Camp Shelby. Besides the assets mentioned
above, the blue forces included intercept aircraft on CAP over the Gulf. The purpose of
the exercises was to use the joint assets to detect, track, identify, and successfully engage
the opposition force without incurring fratricide. [Ref. 17]
b. Mission Objective
The objective of the joint air defense mission was to maximize the
probability of kill of all hostile air targets through the utilization of joint assets, while
minimizing the loss of blue force assets due to enemy and friendly fire. [Ref. 1 7]
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c. Mission Analysis
A generic ASCIET95 C3I information flow diagram is shown in Figure
14. The challenges are to provide timely connectivity between all multi-service C3I





Figure 14. ASCIET95 Information Flow [From Ref. 17]
In ASCIET95, the ID coordinator shown in Figure 14 was the Combat
Identification Coordinator (CIDC) and the decision maker was the Regional Air Defense
Commander (RADC). In addition an Interface Control Officer (ICO) had a key
responsibility for providing a connectivity and data link picture to the RADC. [Ref. 17]
Joint air defense operations (JADO) control responsibilities were
decentralized to an assigned regional air defense commander (RADC) who exercised
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overall command and control of all participating joint air defense forces. The RADC
could divide the exercise airspace further into sectors (i.e., overwater/overland) and
delegate JADO control responsibilities to a designated sector anti-air warfare commander.
The purpose of designating a RADC was to minimize the overall number of independent
decision makers within a given theater of operations, provide a centralized focal point for
communications connectivity, and reduce the time for target ID-to-allocation-to-
destruction process. [Ref. 17]
The Aegis, E-2, TAOC, and E-3 functioned as the RADC at various times
during ASCIET95 and provided final ID, allocation and engagement authority. [Ref. 17]
The CIDC received ID data from various ID sources/providers and associated it with
other track data to determine the correct ID. The CIDC then recommended that ID to the
RADC. During ASCIET 95, Aegis, RC-135, EP-3 and the E-2C functioned as the CIDC
to resolve probable ID recommendations from the other CID systems. [Ref. 17]
All of the units participating as RADCs, CIDCs, ICOs, and shooters in
ASCIET95 had to be linked by a communications network. There are a variety of
communications links used by individual units, but no single link is common to all of the
units. A communications architecture used in ASCIET95 that interfaces the various links
is shown on Figure 15.
During ASCIET95, it was observed that the effectiveness of the air
defense system strongly depended on the time latency of data reaching the CIDC and then
the RADC. The system began to lose ability to correlate data as information was delayed
reaching the CIDC. As a result, multiple tracks of the same air vehicle were displayed
and target IDs were miscorrelated with target tracks. In some cases when there were
approximately 70 actual air vehicles (both blue and red combatants and background
commercial air traffic) in the battle space, there were approximately 200 unique tracks
being reported to the CIDC. This caused long differential delays of information coming
from separate nodes as well as long overall delays of information coming from single
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nodes, resulting in track reports of the same target from different reporting nodes falling
outside of correlation windows. [Ref. 17]
A=TADILA








Figure 15. ASCIET95 Communications Architecture [From Ref. 17]
Delays were due to two factors: 1) disparities in communications systems'
bandwidths and delays at network translators led to bottlenecks in the flow of
information; and 2) multiple nodes reporting the same information led to an overload of
the tactical networks and resulted in long network cycle times. Differential delays
between JTIDS and TADIL-A sources of information were reduced as message loading
was reduced. Similarly, differential delays between sources of information from different
nodes within the same JTIDS net and different nodes within the same TADIL-A net were
reduced as a function of message loading. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 16, network
loading and the control of the amount of information on a joint air defense system
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network had an important effect on the ability of the system to successfully meet the joint










Figure 16. Number of Messages vs. Time Delay [Ref. 17]
d. Conclusions
Analysis of ASCIET95 indicates that all of interoperability requirements
specified in the consolidated initiative matrix, Table 2, were met. All systems were linked
using interoperable communications links and translators. Common message formats
were used. However, there were additional mission-specific requirements that were not
identified prior to conducting ASCIET95. These included maximum time delays in
information reaching the combat ID coordinator, maximum differential delays in
information being reported on the same target by different nodes, and a maximum
network loading that depended on the particular network type.
Current interoperability guidelines say that this type of additional mission-
specific requirement will be identified during analysis of mission interoperability
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requirements. However, these types of interoperability requirements can often only be
discovered at the joint mission analysis level. Service-specific systems developed for
service-specific missions may not be fully interoperable for joint missions ifjoint mission
requirements have not been completely analyzed by the developing service. Therefore,
there is a need to look at potential joint mission applications of individual service system
developments and derive the necessary additional interoperability requirements arising
from joint applications.
Also, in the case of ASCIET95, there was an identified need to provide
network control at the system level in order to reduce network delays. The requirement
for network control at this level is a joint requirement and leads to the need for new
hardware and/or software that is not a service-specific development item but is a joint
development item. This identifies the need to have a joint service systems engineering
organization responsible for some subset of interoperability issues.
2. Joint Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Mission Profile
a. Scenario
An example of a joint tactical ballistic missile (TBM) defense scenario is
shown in Figure 17. Here we have assumed a littoral environment typical of a Korean
theater. Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot batteries are
stationed on the land area. Future Aegis-based mid-tier missile defense systems are
offshore. An Air Force future airborne laser (ABL) is overhead. The ABL will be capable
of detecting, tracking, engaging, and killing TBMs during their boost phase at long stand-
off ranges, up to 500 miles. THAAD and Aegis systems are mid-tier systems, capable of
detecting, tracking, engaging, and killing TBMs during midcourse, after booster burnout
and separation. PATRIOT is a lower tier defense system, capable of defending point




Point Defense Air Defense Boost Phase Intercept Destruction of Launchers
Figure 17. Joint Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Scenario
b. Mission Objective
The objective of a joint tactical ballistic missile defense mission is to
detect, track, engage, and perform complete raid attrition of the missile attack with the
most efficient application of joint detection, tracking, and firepower capabilities. [Ref.
18]
c. Mission Analysis
Figure 17 shows a schematic of a tactical ballistic missile flight, from
launch to impact, as well as the approximate intercept regions of ABL, THAAD, AEGIS,
and PATRIOT.
ABL uses an infrared surveillance system and will detect a missile launch
as soon as the missile breaks cloud top, approximately 40 seconds after launch for high
cloud cover, or immediately upon launch in clear skies. ABL can rapidly develop a high
accuracy track of the missile due to the high resolution and measurement accuracy of the
electro-optical surveillance system. ABL can then engage and kill missiles during the
boost phase, but since kill times using the directed energy weapon are on the order of 5-
10 seconds ABL can only engage a subset of a large missile attack. [Ref. 18]
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THAAD and AEGIS both perform exoatmospheric engagements on
incoming missiles. Detection and tracking is performed by the THAAD ground-based
radars and the AEGIS SPY radars, respectively. These radars detect targets after launch,
at the radar horizon if they are looking in the proper area, and detection ranges are
typically several hundred miles. The radars can be cued by ABL or by space-based
sensors in order to focus their radar energy in a narrow beam that allows earlier detection
of targets in some situations. Both systems develop fire control quality data for their own
weapons. The AEGIS system might also incorporate the cooperative engagement
capability (CEC) system which sends fire-control-quality track data from any CEC
platform to all other CEC platforms. All CEC equipped platforms have the same set of
radar processing software and hardware, and all CEC radars are gridlocked to high
accuracy, resulting in all CEC platforms having identical track pictures. All CEC systems
must be linked by a high (2-10 MHz) bandwidth system to allow data transfer and
sensor gridlocking. PATRIOT detects, tracks, and engages leakers in the lower tier.
PATRIOT can be cued by track data from THAAD and AEGIS. [Ref. 18]
There are several interoperability issues that must be addressed in order to
coordinate the system and achieve optimal joint performance. These issues are related to
three levels of coordinated activity. First, the systems would have to be linked via
communications systems in near real-time in order to provide cueing from tier to tier.
Second, the systems would have to be linked via communications systems in real time or
near real time in order to relay information concerning which targets have been engaged
or are planned to be engaged, and which targets have been killed or failed to be killed.
Failing to do this will result in multiple shots at the same target, leakers that are not
engaged by any system, and extraneous track information due to unidentified interceptor
missiles in-flight. Third, the systems could be linked in real time in such a way that
would allow the theater battle management to be coordinated jointly, rather than relying
on areas of responsibility. The advantage of joint battle management is that it allows
optimal joint system performance provided information flow timelines can be met. Joint
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battle management requires that all systems be linked via a communications system in
real time; if CEC is to be used theater-wide then the communications system must be
high bandwidth. Each participating system must have a battle management software
system that is interoperable with all other system battle management software systems in
terms of message formats, data elements, data accuracies and update rates; in terms of
modularity of function (each individual system must be able to operate as a node in a
distributed battle management system); and in terms of shared system information. The
latter refers to the need to know exact details of every system's state, including magazine
state, in order to determine optimum distributed firing allocations. The requirements
associated with these three levels of coordinated operation are listed in Table 3. [Ref. 18]
d. Conclusions
Analysis of the example joint tactical ballistic missile defense mission
indicates that all of the interoperability requirements specified in Table 2 apply. All
systems need to be linked using interoperable communications links and translators.
Common message formats need to be used. However, there were additional mission-
specific requirements that are not identified in Table 2. These include the need for real-
time or near-real-time communications links so that maximum time delays in information
reaching the various missile defense tiers is short enough to allow the required action by
each tier. There is a need to transmit information that is internal to each of the systems to
all other systems. This requires that the systems be designed such that there are real time
transmittals of the internal information to external systems, and that the information is in
a common format. Finally, level 3 of coordinated action requires that the internal
functioning of the systems be designed such that battle management can be performed
externally to each system as well as internally. Level 3 coordination also requires
development of a joint battle management system with all of the interoperability










Near real-time X X X






Kill assessment X X
Tracks X X
Sensor data x (with CEC, excluding
ABL)








Table 3. Derived Interoperability Requirements for Joint Tactical Ballistic Missile
Defense [From Ref. 18].
3. Global Positioning System Profile
a. Scenario
The application of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology has
increased the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. Military users in air, on land,
and at sea receive accurate navigational information to guide their fighting force within
every environment. GPS technology is being incorporated within networked positioning
systems to increase the navigational accuracy at all levels. As the services conduct more
joint operations and training, the need to share accurate positioning information becomes
essential in the joint battlespace environment. Ground troops from one service may
receive support from both air and sea units of another. Figure 1 8 illustrates an operational







Figure 18. Joint Battlespace Scenario
b. Mission Objective
Within this proposed operational scenario, there is no established means
for both air and ground forces to pass navigational and positioning information or
coordinate operations. The lack of communications connectivity between air and ground
elements is not only limited, but extremely dangerous for all entities involved. Figure 1
9
represents a proposed operational architecture for the insertion of GPS data and
establishment of critical communications links between air and ground units.
Both air and ground units receive accurate positioning information from
the GPS satellite constellation. As air and ground forces come within some predetermined
range of each other, they begin to exchange positioning information through a







Figure 19. Proposed Communications Architecture
c. Mission Analysis
The communications data link must be established early enough to provide
positioning and navigational systems the time to process the information received. Also,
force elements require ample time to observe, recognize, and react safely in support of
real-time operations. If aircraft navigational systems use earth-centered coordinates and
ground force positioning systems use flat earth coordinates for operation, systems require
design parameters to perform information conversion and maintain functionality to
support timely information flow. Predetermined range identification distances may need
to be increased to support real-time operations.
50
d. Conclusions
Both air and ground unit systems must use standard message formats and
data elements, as specified in Table 2. The timing and accuracy of navigational data
passed over a communications link between air and ground assets is critical for C4I
systems of this type. Information must be timely to ensure C4I systems successfully
support users and accurate enough to clearly represent the operational environment. The
operational field of view greatly differs between aircraft and ground forces; therefore,
accurate information is key to operational awareness.
4. High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Imagery Data
Link Profile
a. Scenario
With lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, the DoD found
existing deficiencies in military Operations Other Than War (OOTW) which included the
following: [Ref. 19]
• Lack of broad area coverage
• Limited Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
• Limited imagery dissemination to users
• Limited information retrieval and distribution of intelligence data
• Insufficient information to support Warfighter situational awareness
• Insufficient high resolution imagery intelligence to support precision strikes
• Reconnaissance that is not synchronized with the Warfighter
The goal of the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE
UAV) is to provide quality extended reconnaissance that is responsive to the operational
Warfighters' needs. [Ref. 19]
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b. Mission Objective
The HAE UAV system is designed to provide near real-time (NRT)
transmission of sensor imagery. The HAE UAV is a long dwell tactical surveillance and
reconnaissance system that is capable of sustained high altitude operations over and into
high threat areas. The system can operate at ranges in excess of 500 nautical miles from
the launch area and loiter over the target area more than eight hours at an altitude greater
than 45,000 feet. The HAE UAV employs both wideband line-of-sight (LOS) and
moderate bandwidth satellite communications. [Ref. 19]
The HAE UAV system contains a ground segment (mission control
element (MCE)), ground communications element, launch and recovery element (LRE)),
and support segment, which can be mission transportable to any theater of operations via
three C-141 aircraft or equivalent loads. [Ref. 19] Figure 20 shows an operational view of
the HAE UAV system.
The system is designed to provide 24 hour continuous coverage of desired
areas of interest using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Electro-Optic (EO), and Infrared
(IR) sensors. The HAE UAV system can collect imagery of pre-planned areas of interest
and quickly transmit the messages to combat commanders. [Ref. 19]
c. Mission Analysis
Figure 20 illustrates the program objective for using a satellite link for the
transmission of imagery data from the aircraft to the MCE and selected imagery data
from the aircraft to exploitation sites and tactical users. Using commercial satellites, data
rates up to 50 Mbps are expected, while T-l rates are anticipated for links to tactical
elements. Figure 21 illustrates the second method for imagery transmission from the
aircraft to the MCE, exploitation elements, and tactical users. Through LOS systems,
aircraft to MCE and exploitation elements data rates will increase to 137 Mbps, and links





Figure 20. In Theater Operational HAE UAV System using Commercial SATCOM




Figure 21. In Theater Operational HAE UAV System using Common LOS Data
Links [From Ref. 19]
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Different operational parameters change C4I system development. The two
communications architecture options, illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 21, create
different requirements for the design and development of C4I systems to support both the
MCE and exploitation elements—the interoperable designs have become mission-
specific.
d. Conclusions
Since the LOS link from the aircraft to the tactical user remains the same,
the development of the tactical users' terminal requires no apparent change. The possible
bandwidth limitations may even alter the operational use and employment of the system.
New dissemination devices may have to be designed to support the distribution of
imagery to the user.
5. Close Air Support Profile
a. Scenario
Commanders use close air support (CAS) to focus firepower at the
decisive place and time to achieve local combat superiority. Figure 22 depicts the flow of
information from the time that friendly ground forces identify an enemy threat to the
delivery of munitions on the target. Requests for CAS are usually on high frequency
(HF), ultra high frequency (UHF), and very high frequency (VHF) radio voice nets.
Tactical air control parties (TACPs), liaisons to ground forces, request CAS through the
direct air support center (DASC); this may be an airborne C2 platform. By monitoring the
Tactical Air Request (TAR) Net, battalion, regiment, and division level fire support
coordination centers (FSCCs) approve requests by remaining silent and deny or alter
requests as needed. [Ref. 20]
b. Mission Objective
CAS execution must be responsive to quickly support forward ground
forces. To deter the fast-paced threats of the battlefield and to lower operational risks,










Figure 22. Information Flow for Close Air Support Requests
c. Mission Analysis
C4I systems must be flexible to support tactical users at multiple locations
throughout the battlefield. The delay of information may place forces at risk. Even though
CAS requests are not automated, there are many operational and design tradeoffs for C4I
systems to ensure the request process can support real-time operations. Radio voice
quality must be understandable for users to quickly identify essential information without
retransmission.
d. Conclusions
As defined in Table 2, C4I system designs with common standards ensure all forces have
reliable connectivity to conduct operations for real-time operations. If C4I systems do not
facilitate CAS operations, the ability to access powerful lethal assets becomes limited.
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High voice quality for systems alleviates the need for retransmission. If the request
structure required data links, mission-specific parameters would change the design of the
C4I system to achieve adequate interoperability.
6. Mission-Specific Area Matrix
In Table 4, mission profile areas are compared against one another using four of
seven information quality criteria identified in Joint Publication 6-0. These criteria are:
[Ref. 21]
• Accuracy. Information that conveys the true situation.
• Timeliness. Information that is available in time to make decisions.
• Completeness. All necessary information required by the decision maker.
• Security. Information that has been afforded adequate protection where
required.
From these criteria, an interoperability profile can be created. Each area is given a
rating of high, medium (med), or low. For high, the C4I system attribute is essential or
extremely relevant to support warfighter operations in real-time. For a medium rating, the
system attribute is critical or relevant to support operations in near real-time (NRT), and
low is important, but not as timely as NRT.
Timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and security criteria for a C4I system can be
quantified to better define a desired system's requirements. As identified in Table 4, there
are significant differences and the depth, level, detail, etc. of interoperability must be
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Table 4. Mission-Specific Matrix
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G. SUMMARY
The DoD and services have initiated extensive visions to focus service efforts and
achieve C4I system interoperability. Service actions are tailored to support individual
needs and requirements, and standards are clearly defined and accessible to facilitate joint
C4I interoperability development of future systems. Technical architectures and reference
codes provide the guidance to design interoperable systems, but every system is not the
same. Each system requires systems engineering analysis to ensure mission-specific
parameters are met, and interoperability is more than seamless interfaces. In addition to
timeliness, data and information may require different accuracy, completeness, and
security levels for C4I systems to be functional. As noted within Table 2, a consolidated
initiative matrix, every service has defined actions to achieve interoperability, but as the
mission-specific examples of this chapter have demonstrated, as shown in Table 4, every
case is different. C4I system purposes, missions, operational architectures, etc. affect
system parameters that ensure interoperable systems are functional.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The term interoperability has little meaning unless specific parameters
are described and specified... [Ref. 1]
C4I for the Warrior
12 June 1992
A. INTRODUCTION
Even the original C4IFTW document identified that every system is not the same,
and system parameters must be specified in detail. Building on the previous five chapters,
this chapter identifies critical issues, provides direction, and recommends research areas
requiring analysis. Chapter VI contains the following sections: conclusions,
recommendations, and further research. The conclusions section formalizes analysis
observations identified, and the recommendations section presents three initiatives to
enhance the development of joint C4I systems. Finally, the further research section
identifies four areas of study for DoD graduate students.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The definition of interoperability specified in Joint Publication 1-02 is vague
regarding mission-specific C4I systems. As written, the definition requires the users,
developers, planners, designers, etc. to further define interoperability for each mission-
specific case. Alone, the ability to pass data through seamless interfaces does not ensure
that systems receive information in a timely manner to render the system functional.
Also, incomplete and inaccurate information can not only mislead, but slow down the
warfighter's decision making process. C4I systems must be designed to facilitate
command and control and provide a well-defined picture of the battlespace without
confusion. Interoperability must be defined for the system frame of reference and the use
of the C4I system.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. C4I System Mission Interoperability Profiles
As identified in Joint Publication 6-0, information flow must be nearly
instantaneous both vertically and horizontally within an organizational structure [Ref.
21]. This publication further describes the information quality criteria listed in Table 5.
Accuracy Information that conveys the true situation
Relevance Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand
Timeliness Information that is available in time to make decisions
Usability Information that is common, easily understood format and displays
Completeness All necessary information required by the decision maker
Brevity Information that has only the level of detail required
Security Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required
Table 5. Information Quality Criteria [From Ref. 21]
From accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and security information quality
criteria, an interoperability profile can be created. These criteria or attributes for a C4I
system can be quantified to better define a desired system's requirements. For example, a
system that transports essential air defense information must be more accurate, timely,
and complete to react to a real-time threat than a system that passes imagery. This is a
simplified example, but consider the quantifiable differences for each item of criteria. C4I
systems must be interoperable, but to what level? If an air defense system is considered
interoperable and accurately passes complete information both vertically and
horizontally, but fails to pass this information in a timely manner, then the system is
useless.
Establishing profiles for C4I systems will further define and describe user
requirements and assist system designers and developers to ensure adequate levels of
interoperability. To just identify interoperable levels provides no quantifiable
characteristic to follow.






Accuracy Data accuracy that conveys the true situation percentage or Bit
Error Rate
Timeliness Time allocated for data to reach a C4I system so it may be
processed in time to render the system effective
measured in seconds
or milliseconds
Completeness Data amount that conveys the true situation percentage
Security Security level required for system operation (e. g., unclass,
secret, etc.)
Table 6. Proposed Interoperability Profiles
Profiles must be initially established as C4I system requirements are defined and
optimized through modeling and simulation and joint testing processes. The overall
purpose of mission-specific profiles is not to create unrealistic requirements and delay the
development process for C4I systems, but to establish thresholds to guide designers from
requirement definition through initial design, modeling and simulation, and subsequent
system upgrades. As DoD guidance and technology advance, profiles should be updated
to better support interoperability of like systems—they, too, are continually evolving.
2. Joint Scenario Testing
DoD Directive 4630.5, Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of C3I
Systems, states that all C4I systems are considered joint unless exemptions are granted.
As indicated by the ASCIET95 series of tests, systems must be modeled and simulated
and tested in joint scenarios. Interoperability is much more than reliable interfaces. C4I
systems may seamlessly interface, but they are not interoperable if the traffic load from
joint and service specific systems creates time delays rendering the overall network of
systems ineffective. Joint scenario modeling and simulation and testing is essential to
ensure interoperability of networked systems.
3. On-line Interoperability Standards
The US Air Force's development of Technical Reference Codes (TRCs) has
dramatically enhanced progress to achieve interoperability for all Air Force C4I systems.
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Up-to-date standards and system development information can be quickly accessed to
guide system planners, developers, and designers within the Air Force. The logical
organization of TRC development standards is an effective tool for the commercial
industry as well as service personnel. As long as TRCs are adequately maintained, the
time from requirements definition to placing the C4I system in the hands of the
warfighter will be reduced. All services must adopt this real-time concept of operations.
D. FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Further Develop C4I System Interoperability Profiles
From today's proposed interoperability levels, further develop C4I system profiles
to quantify design requirements of military systems.
2. Model a System Development Process
Using commercial industry and theoretical automated information system
development techniques, model a system development process that uses the DoD
interrelated set of architectures as the starting point.
3. Identify Key Data Repository Elements
Compare commercial industry and military automated information system
development techniques to identify similarities and differences and key data repository
elements for military application.
4. Further Develop the Copernicus...Forward Vision
Further develop the Copernicus...Forward vision to strengthen the US Navy and
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